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Information-theoretically Secure Regenerating
Codes for Distributed Storage
Nihar B. Shah, K. V. Rashmi and P. Vijay Kumar
Abstract—Regenerating codes are a class of codes for dis-
tributed storage networks that provide reliability and availability
of data, and also perform efficient node repair. Another important
aspect of a distributed storage network is its security. In this
paper, we consider a threat model where an eavesdropper may
gain access to the data stored in a subset of the storage nodes,
and possibly also, to the data downloaded during repair of some
nodes. We provide explicit constructions of regenerating codes
that achieve information-theoretic secrecy capacity in this setting.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider a distributed storage system consisting of n
storage nodes in a network, each having a capacity to store α
symbols over a finite field Fq of size q. Data corresponding
to B message symbols (the message), each drawn uniformly
and independently from Fq , is to be dispersed across these n
nodes. An end-user (called a data-collector) must be able to
reconstruct the entire message by downloading the data stored
in any subset of k nodes. If data-reconstruction was the only
requirement, any [n, k] maximum-distance-separable (MDS)
code such as a Reed-Solomon code would suffice.
A second important aspect of a distributed storage system
is the handling of node failures. When a storage node fails, it
is replaced by a new, empty node. The replacement node is
required to obtain the data that was previously stored in the
failed node by downloading data from the remaining nodes
in the network. A typical means of accomplishing this is to
download the entire message from the network, and extract
the desired data from it. However, downloading the entire
message, when it eventually stores only a fraction 1
k
of it,
is clearly wasteful of the network resources.
Recently, Dimakis et al. [1] introduced a new class of
codes called ‘regenerating codes’ which are efficient with
respect to both storage space utilization and the amount of data
downloaded for repair (termed repair-bandwidth). Regenerat-
ing codes permit node repair by downloading β symbols from
any subset of d (≥ k) remaining nodes, and the total repair-
bandwidth dβ is typically much smaller than the message size
B. In [1] the authors also establish that the parameters involved
must necessarily satisfy the bound:
B ≤
k−1∑
i=0
min (α, (d− i)β) . (1)
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It can be deduced (see [1]) that achieving equality in (1), with
parameters B, k and d fixed, leads to a tradeoff between the
storage space α and the repair-bandwidth dβ. In this tradeoff,
the case of minimizing α first and then β (for fixed d) is
termed as the minimum storage regenerating (MSR) case,
while carrying out the minimization in the reverse order is
termed the minimum bandwidth regenerating (MBR) case.
More details on the MSR and MBR cases are provided later
in the paper. Explicit constructions of MSR and MBR codes
achieving this bound can be found in [2], [4]–[6].
The focus of the present paper is on an additional, important
aspect of distributed storage systems, namely, security of the
data. Nowadays, individuals as well as businesses are increas-
ingly storing their data over untrusted networks. Peer-to-peer
storage systems have storage nodes spread out geographically.
Such situations make the data prone to prying adversaries that
may gain access to the data stored in some of the nodes. An
eavesdropper can also gain additional information by listening
to the data downloaded during multiple instances of repair
of these nodes. It is imperative to prevent such entities from
gaining any useful information. The present paper constructs
explicit codes which, while satisfying the reconstruction and
repair requirements in the distributed storage network, prevents
such an eavesdropper from obtaining any information about
the original message.
The threat model considered in this paper is as follows. An
eavesdropper can gain read-access to the data stored in any
set of at-most ℓ (< k) storage nodes. The eavesdropper may
also gain read-access to the data being downloaded during
(possibly multiple instances of) repair of some ℓ′ (≤ ℓ) of
these ℓ nodes. Note that the data downloaded by a replacement
node during any instance of repair also contains the data that
is eventually stored in that node. This is formalized in the
following definition.
Definition 1 ({ℓ, ℓ′} secure distributed storage system):
Consider a distributed storage system in which an
eavesdropper gains access to the data stored in some
(ℓ − ℓ′) nodes, and the data stored as well as the data
downloaded during repair in some other ℓ′ nodes. An {ℓ, ℓ′}
secure distributed storage system is one in which such an
eavesdropper obtains no information about the message.
We assume that the eavesdroppers have unbounded com-
putational power, are passive, non-collusive, and that the
underlying code is globally known. As an example of this
model, consider a peer-to-peer storage system. The ℓ′ nodes
described above may represent nodes that are in a network
belonging to an adversary, thereby allowing the eavesdropper
to listen to all the data downloaded as these ℓ′ nodes undergo
(possibly multiple) failures and repairs across time. On the
other hand, the (ℓ− ℓ′) nodes may represent the nodes which
2may be exposed only momentarily, allowing the eavesdropper
access to only the data stored.
The problem of providing information-theoretic secrecy in
distributed storage systems can be related to the Wiretap
Channel II [7] where an eavesdropper, listening to any ar-
bitrary subset (of fixed size) of symbols being transmitted
over a noiseless point-to-point channel, obtains essentially
no information about the original message. While schemes
providing secrecy in a distributed storage system with only
the reconstruction requirement would follow from [7], the
requirement of addressing node-repair makes the problem
harder. Among recent results in the context of distributed
storage, the problem of securely disseminating encoded data to
the storage nodes is considered in [8], and an analysis of com-
munication and interaction requirements between the nodes is
provided. In [9], the authors consider the situation where data
is stored over two networks, and an eavesdropper may gain
access to any one of these networks. Connections between
optimal repair in distributed storage and communication across
multiple-access wiretap channels are established in [10].
The system model considered in the present paper is based
on the model introduced by Pawar et al. [3]. In [3], the authors
consider the case when ℓ′ = ℓ and provide an upper bound
on the number of message symbols B(s) that can be stored in
the information-theoretically secure system as
B(s) ≤
k−1∑
i=ℓ
min (α, (d− i)β) . (2)
The bound in (2) can be interpreted in the following intuitive
manner. Out of the k nodes to which a data-collector con-
nects, consider the case where the first ℓ of these nodes are
compromised. Thus, assuming the secrecy goals have been
met, these ℓ nodes will provide zero information about the
message symbols, and only the remaining (k − ℓ) nodes in
the summation in (1) provide useful information. It can be
shown that the bound in (2) is, in fact, an upper bound on the
number of message symbols in an information-theoretically
secure system for all values of ℓ′.
In the sequel, notation pertaining to the secure version of
the code will frequently be indicated by the superscript (s).
For instance, B(s) denotes the number of message symbols in
a system with secrecy constraints, and B denotes the number
of message symbols in a system without secrecy constraints
(i.e., when ℓ = ℓ′ = 0). Note that the difference B − B(s) is
the price paid for the additional secrecy constraint.
In [3], the authors also show that the MBR code presented
in [4] for the parameters [n, k, d = n − 1] can be made
information-theoretically secure by making use of a nested
MDS code in the construction.
In the present paper, we provide explicit constructions for
information-theoretically secure MBR and MSR codes for:
1) MBR, all parameters [n, k, d], and
2) MSR, all parameters [n, k, d ≥ 2k − 2] .
Each of the constructions presented is {ℓ, ℓ′} information-
theoretically secure, for all values of ℓ and ℓ′. The secure MBR
code presented is optimal for all {ℓ, ℓ′}, and the secure MSR
code presented is optimal for all values of ℓ when ℓ′ = 0. Thus
this also establishes the secrecy capacity of such a system for
each of these parameter values. It is unknown at present as to
whether or not the MSR code presented here is optimal for
ℓ′ ≥ 1.
The secure codes provided in the present paper are based
on our previous work [2], where we construct explicit regen-
erating codes for the parameters listed above. The codes in [2]
are based on a new Product-Matrix (PM) framework. We will
call the MBR and MSR codes of [2] as the PM-MBR and
PM-MSR codes respectively, and the corresponding secure
versions constructed in the present paper as the secure PM-
MSR and the secure PM-MBR codes respectively.
While all other regenerating codes in the literature require
the number of nodes n to be equal to d+1, the PM codes [2]
do not pose any such constraint. Thus the PM codes are
well suited for distributed storage systems where the number
of nodes n may vary in time, or where the connectivity d
required for repair may be low. These codes are also linear,
i.e., each symbol in the system is a linear combination of
the message symbols. As we shall subsequently see, the PM
framework possesses two additional attributes that makes it
more attractive for constructing secure codes: (a) exact-repair,
and (b) data downloaded by a node for repair is independent
of the set of d nodes to which it connects. A more detailed
discussion is provided in Section V.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the general approach followed in the paper for code
construction and for proving information-theoretic secrecy.
Section III presents the secure MBR code for all parameters
[n, k, d] and {ℓ, ℓ′}. Section IV presents the secure MSR
codes for all parameters [n, k, d ≥ 2k − 2] and {ℓ, ℓ′}. The
paper concludes with a discussion in Section V.
II. APPROACH
We approach the problem of providing secrecy in the pres-
ence of eavesdroppers, in the following manner. To construct a
secure code for a given [n, k, d], we choose the corresponding
PM code [2] with the same values of system parameters
[n, k, d]. In the input to the PM code (without secrecy), we
replace a specific, carefully chosen set of
R = B −B(s) (3)
message symbols with R random symbols. Each of these
random symbols are chosen uniformly and independently from
Fq, and are also independent of the message symbols.
If the random symbols are treated as message symbols, the
secure code becomes identical to the original code. Hence, the
processes of reconstruction and repair in the secure code can
be carried out in the same way as in the original code.
To prove {ℓ, ℓ′} secrecy of our codes, we consider the
worst case scenario where an eavesdropper has access to
precisely {ℓ, ℓ′} nodes. Let U denote the collection of the
B(s) message symbols, and let R denote the collection of
R random symbols as defined in (3). Further, let E denote
the collection of symbols that the eavesdropper gains access
to. For each of the codes presented in this paper, the proof
of information-theoretic secrecy proceeds in the following
manner. All logarithms are taken to the base q.
3Step 1: We show that given all the message symbols U
as side-information, the eavesdropper can recover all the R
random symbols, i.e., H(R|E ,U) = 0.
Step 2: Next we show that all but R of the symbols obtained
by the eavesdropper are functions of these R symbols, i.e.,
H(E) ≤ R.
Step 3: We finally show that the two conditions listed
in steps 1 and 2 above necessarily implies that the mutual
information between the message symbols U and the symbols
E obtained by the eavesdropper is zero, i.e., I(U ; E) = 0.
III. SECURE MBR CODES FOR ALL [n, k, d], {ℓ, ℓ′}
MBR codes achieve the minimum possible repair-
bandwidth: a replacement node downloads only what it stores,
i.e., have dβ = α. Substituting this in the bound in (1),
and replacing the inequality with equality, we get that in the
absence of secrecy requirements an MBR code must satisfy
B =
(
kd−
(
k
2
))
β, α = dβ . (4)
In this section, we present explicit constructions of
information-theoretically secure MBR codes for all parameter
values [n, k, d] and all {ℓ, ℓ′}. These codes meet the upper
bound (2) on the total number of message symbols, thus
showing that (2) is indeed the secrecy capacity at the MBR
point for all parameters. These codes are based on the PM-
MBR codes constructed in [2]. We first provide a brief
description of the PM-MBR codes, before moving on to the
construction of the secure PM-MBR codes.
We construct codes for the case β = 1, and codes for any
higher value of β can be obtained by a simple concatenation
of the β = 1 code. In the terminology of distributed storage,
this process is known as striping. Thus an MBR code with
β = 1 has α = d.
A. Recap of the Product-Matrix MBR codes
The PM-MBR code [2] can be described in terms of an (n×
α) code matrix C, where the α elements in its ith row represent
the α symbols stored in node i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). The code matrix
C is a product of two matrices: a fixed (n×d) encoding matrix
Ψ and a (d×α) message matrix M comprising the B message
symbols in a possibly redundant fashion, i.e.,
C = ΨM . (5)
Denoting the ith row of Ψ as ψt
i
, the α symbols stored in
the ith storage node is expressed as ψt
i
M . The superscript ‘t’
denotes the transpose of a matrix.
In the PM-MBR code, the encoding matrix Ψ and the
message matrix M are of the form
Ψ︸︷︷︸
n×d
=
[
Φ︸︷︷︸
n×k
∆︸︷︷︸
n×(d−k)
]
, M︸︷︷︸
d×d
=


S︸︷︷︸
k×k
T︸︷︷︸
k×(d−k)
T t︸︷︷︸
(d−k)×k
0︸︷︷︸
(d−k)×(d−k)


The matrices Φ and ∆ are chosen in such a way that (a) any
k rows of Φ are linearly independent, and (b) any d rows
of Ψ are linearly independent. These requirements can be
met, for example, by choosing Ψ to be either a Cauchy or
a Vandermonde matrix. The choice of the matrix Ψ governs
the choice of the size q of the finite field Fq , e.g., choosing
Ψ as Vandermonde allows us to use any q ≥ n.
The matrices S and T in the message matrix M are
populated by the B message symbols,
B = kd−
(
k
2
)
= k(d− k) +
k(k + 1)
2
, (6)
as follows. The k(k+1)2 symbols in the upper triangular half
of the (k× k) symmetric matrix S and the k(d− k) elements
in the (k× (d− k)) matrix T are set equal to the B message
symbols. Note thatthe symmetry of matrix S makes M also
symmetric.
Example 1: We illustrate the code with an example; this
example will also be used subsequently to illustrate the secure
code. Let n = 6, k = 3, d = 4. Then with β = 1, we get
α = d = 4 and B = 9. We design the code over the finite
field F7. The (6 × 4) encoding matrix Ψ can be chosen as a
Vandermonde matrix with its ith row as ψt
i
= [1 i i2 i3].
The matrices S and T , and hence the message matrix M are
populated by the 9 message symbols {ui}9i=1 as
S =

u1 u2 u3u2 u4 u5
u3 u5 u6

 , T =

u7u8
u9

 ,M =


u1 u2 u3 u7
u2 u4 u5 u8
u3 u5 u6 u9
u7 u8 u9 0

 .
We now describe the reconstruction and the repair processes
in the PM-MBR code.
1) Reconstruction: Let ΨDC =
[
ΦDC ∆DC
]
be the
(k × d) submatrix of Ψ, corresponding to the k rows of Ψ to
which the data-collector connects. Thus the data-collector has
access to the symbols ΨDCM =
[
ΦDCS +∆DCT
t ΦDCT
]
.
By construction, the matrix ΦDC is nonsingular. Hence, by
multiplying the matrix ΨDCM on the left by Φ−1DC , one can
recover first the matrix T and subsequently, the matrix S.
2) Repair: Let ψt
f
be the row of Ψ corresponding to the
failed node f . Thus the d symbols stored in the failed node
are ψt
f
M. The replacement for the failed node f connects to
an arbitrary set {hi|1 ≤ i ≤ d} of d remaining nodes. Each of
these d nodes passes on the inner product (ψt
hi
M)ψ
f
to the
replacement node. Thus from these d nodes, the replacement
node obtains the d = α symbols ΨrepMψf , where Ψrep =[
ψ
h1
· · ·ψ
hd
]t
. By construction, the (d × d) matrix Ψrep is
invertible. This allows the replacement node to recover Mψ
f
.
Since M is symmetric, (Mψ
f
)t = ψt
f
M which is precisely
the data stored in the node prior to failure.
B. Information-theoretic Secrecy in the PM-MBR Code
For the MBR code, we have dβ = α, i.e., a replacement
node stores all the data that it downloads during its repair.
Thus an eavesdropper does not obtain any extra information
from the data that is downloaded for repair. Hence for an MBR
code, we can assume without loss of generality that ℓ′ = 0.
In this section, we will construct codes that achieve the
upper bound in (2) at the MBR point. Substituting α = dβ
4in (2) and replacing the inequality with equality, we get that
such a code must necessarily satisfy
B(s) =
(
kd−
(
k
2
))
β −
(
ld−
(
ℓ
2
))
β . (7)
We now construct an {ℓ, ℓ′} secure MBR code satisfy-
ing (7), based on the PM-MBR code. We denote the PM-MBR
code [2] described above as C, and the secure PM-MBR code
constructed here as C(s). As mentioned previously, we will
present the construction for the case β = 1.
Let Ψ(s) be the (n×d) encoding matrix of code C(s). Choose
Ψ(s) to satisfy the following property in addition to those
required by Ψ: when restricted to the first ℓ columns, any ℓ
rows are linearly independent. The choice of Ψ(s) as a Cauchy
or Vandermonde matrix satisfies this additional property as
well. We now modify the message matrix M of code C to
obtain message matrix M (s) of code C(s). Replace the
R = B −B(s) = ld−
(
ℓ
2
)
(8)
message symbols in the first ℓ rows (and hence first ℓ columns)
of the symmetric matrix M by R random symbols. Each
random symbol is chosen independently and uniformly across
the elements of Fq. Thus the (n×α) code matrix for the secure
PM-MBR code C(s) is given by C(s) = Ψ(s)M (s).
Example 2: We will use the PM-MBR code in Example 1
to obtain a secure PM-MBR code for [n = 6, k = 3, d = 4]
with ℓ = 1. From (7) with β = 1 we get B(s) = 5. Thus we
have R = B−B(s) = 4. We replace the four message symbols
u1, u2, u3 and u7 in Example 1 with random symbols r1, r2,
r3 and r7 drawn uniformly and independently from F7 to get
the new message matrix M (s) as:
M (s) =


r1 r2 r3 r7
r2 u4 u5 u8
r3 u5 u6 u9
r7 u8 u9 0

 . (9)
Since the matrix Ψ in Example 1 is a Vandermonde matrix
which already satisfies the additional property, we retain it in
the new code, i.e., Ψ(s) = Ψ. Thus the secure PM-MBR code
for the desired parameters is given by C(s) = Ψ(s)M (s).
The following theorems prove the properties of reconstruc-
tion, repair and secrecy in the secure PM-MBR code.
Theorem 1 (Reconstruction and Repair): In code C(s) pre-
sented above, a data-collector can recover all the B(s) message
symbols by downloading data stored in any k nodes, and a
failed node can be repaired by downloading one symbol each
from any d remaining nodes.
Proof: Treating the random symbols also as message
symbols, the secure PM-MBR code C(s) becomes identical
to the PM-MBR code C. Thus reconstruction and repair in
C(s) are identical to that in C.
Theorem 2 (Information-theoretic Secrecy): In code C(s)
designed for a given value of ℓ, an eavesdropper having access
to at most ℓ nodes gets no information pertaining to the
message.
Proof: Let Ψ(s)eve be the (ℓ × d) submatrix of Ψ(s),
corresponding to the ℓ rows of Ψ to which the eavesdropper
has gained access. Thus the eavesdropper has access to the ℓd
symbols in the (ℓ× d) matrix E(s) defined as
E(s) = Ψ(s)eveM
(s) . (10)
Following the approach described in Section II, we first
show that given the message symbols as side information, an
eavesdropper can decode all the random symbols. To this end,
define M˜ (s) as a (d×d) matrix obtained by setting all message
symbols in M (s) to zero. Thus M˜ (s) has its first ℓ rows and
first ℓ columns identical to that of M (s), and zeros elsewhere.
Let
E˜(s) = Ψ(s)eveM˜
(s) , (11)
which are the ℓd symbols that the eavesdropper has access
to, given the message symbols as side information. Recall the
property of Ψ(s)eve wherein any ℓ rows, when restricted to the
first ℓ columns, are independent. Thus, recovering the R ran-
dom symbols from E˜ is identical to data reconstruction in the
original PM-MBR code Cˆ designed for [nˆ = n, kˆ = ℓ, dˆ = d],
ℓˆ = 0. Thus, given the message symbols, the eavesdropper can
decode all the random symbols.
The next step is to show that H(E) ≤ R. From the value of
R in (8), it suffices to show that out of the ℓd symbols that the
eavesdropper has access to,
(
ℓ
2
)
of them are functions (linear
combinations) of the rest. Consider, the (ℓ× ℓ) matrix
E(s)(Ψ(s)eve)
t = Ψ(s)eveM
(s)(Ψ(s)eve)
t . (12)
Since M (s) is symmetric, the (ℓ × ℓ) matrix in (12) is also
symmetric. Thus
(
ℓ
2
)
dependencies among the elements of E(s)
can be described by the
(
ℓ
2
)
upper-triangular elements of the
expression
E(s)(Ψ(s)eve)
t −Ψ(s)eve(E
(s))t = 0 . (13)
Using the linear-independence property of the rows of Ψ(s), it
can be shown that these
(
ℓ
2
)
redundant equations are linearly
independent. Thus the eavesdropper has access to at-most ℓd−(
ℓ
2
)
independent symbols, i.e., H(E) ≤ R.
We have shown that in the secure PM-MBR code, steps 1
and 2 of the approach described in Section II hold true. The
final part of the proof, Step 3, establishes that the eavesdropper
obtains no information about the message.
I(U ; E) = H(E)−H(E|U) (14)
≤ R−H(E|U) (15)
= R−H(E|U) +H(E|U ,R) (16)
= R− I(E ;R|U)
= R− (H(R|U)−H(R|E ,U)) (17)
= R−H(R|U) (18)
= R−R (19)
= 0 , (20)
where (15) follows from the result of Step 2; (16) follows
since every symbol in the system is a function of U and R,
giving H(E|U ,R) = 0; (18) follows from the result of Step 1;
and (19) follows since the random symbols are independent
of the message symbols.
5IV. SECURE MSR CODES FOR ALL [n, k, d ≥ 2k−2], {ℓ, ℓ′}
MSR codes achieve the minimum possible storage at each
node. Since a data-collector connecting to any k nodes should
be able to recover all the B message symbols, each node
must necessarily store at-least a fraction 1
k
of the entire data.
Hence for an MSR code we have α = B
k
. It follows from (1)
(replacing the inequality with equality) that in the absence of
secrecy requirements an MSR code must satisfy
B = kα, dβ = α+ (k − 1)β . (21)
From (21) we see that, in general, for an MSR code dβ > α.
Thus the amount of data downloaded during repair is greater
than what is eventually stored. This requires us to distinguish
between the situations when the eavesdropper has access to
only the data stored in a node, and when it has access to the
data downloaded during repair. Note that the data downloaded
by a replacement node during repair also contains the data that
is eventually stored in it.
In this section we present explicit constructions of
information-theoretically secure MSR codes for all parameter
values [n, k, d ≥ 2k − 2] and all {ℓ, ℓ′}. The secure MSR
codes are based on the PM-MSR codes presented in [2].
A. Recap of the Product-Matrix MSR codes
We first provide a brief description of the PM-MSR
code [2]. The code is designed for the case d = 2k − 2, and
can be extended to d > 2k − 2 via shortening (see [2], [5]
for a detailed description of shortening in MSR codes). As in
the MBR case, we construct codes for the case when β = 1.
Setting d = 2k − 2 and β = 1 in (21) gives
B = α(α+ 1), α = k − 1, d = 2α . (22)
The PM-MSR code C in [2] can be described in terms
of an (n × α) code matrix C = ΨM , with the ith row of
C containing the α symbols stored in node i. The (n × d)
encoding matrix Ψ is of the form Ψ = [Φ ΛΦ], where Φ
is an (n × α) matrix and Λ is an (n × n) diagonal matrix
satisfying: (a) any α rows of Φ are linearly independent, (b)
any d rows of Ψ are linearly independent, and (c) the diagonal
elements of Λ are all distinct. The ((d = 2α) × α) message
matrix M is of the form M = [S1 S2]t, where S1 and S2
are (α× α) symmetric matrices. The two matricesS1 and S2
together contain α(α+1) distinct symbols, and these positions
are populated by the B = α(α + 1) message symbols. This
completes the description of the code construction.
A description of the reconstruction and repair operations
under this code can be found in [2]. The repair algorithm
in [2] is such that the data downloaded by any node for repair
is independent of the set of d nodes to which it connects.
This property is highly advantageous while constructing secure
codes, as discussed in Section V.
B. Information-theoretic Secrecy in the PM-MSR Code
For the MSR case, from (2) we get
B(s) ≤ (k − ℓ)α . (23)
On the other hand, the {ℓ, ℓ′} secure MSR codes constructed
in the present paper (for d ≥ 2k − 2) achieve
B(s) = (k − ℓ)(α− ℓ′β) . (24)
Thus our codes are optimal for ℓ′ = 0. As mentioned
previously, it is unknown at present as to whether or not, our
codes are optimal when ℓ′ ≥ 1.
The expression for B(s) in (24) can be interpreted as
follows. Consider a data-collector attempting to reconstruct
the message from the data stored in some k nodes, and an
eavesdropper having access to some ℓ of these k nodes. These
ℓ nodes will not provide any useful information, thus resulting
in the first term (k − ℓ) in the product. Furthermore, the
eavesdropper may have access to the data passed for repair
of some ℓ′ of the ℓ nodes, and hence to the ℓ′β (potentially
distinct) symbols passed by each of the remaining (k − ℓ)
nodes during repair. These symbols should not reveal any
information, and hence the second term (α− ℓ′β).
We now describe the construction of the secure PM-MSR
code (for β = 1). We retain the notation used in Section III-B.
Choose Ψ(s) such that it satisfies the following property in
addition to those required for Ψ: when restricted to the first ℓ
columns, any ℓ rows of Ψ(s) are linearly independent. Next,
define a collection R of
R = B −B(s) = ℓα+ (k − ℓ)ℓ′ (25)
random symbols picked independently with a uniform distri-
bution over the elements of Fq, where (25) follows from (21)
and (24). Use these R random symbols to replace the following
R symbols in the message matrix M of code C, to obtain
matrix M (s): the ℓα −
(
ℓ
2
)
symbols in the first ℓ rows (and
hence the first ℓ columns) of the symmetric matrix S1, the(
ℓ
2
)
symbols in the intersection of the first (ℓ − 1) rows and
first (ℓ − 1) columns of the symmetric matrix S2, and the
(k − ℓ)ℓ′ remaining symbols in the first ℓ′ rows (and hence
the first ℓ′ columns) of S2. The secure PM-MSR code is given
by C(s) = Ψ(s)M (s).
The following theorems prove the properties of reconstruc-
tion, repair and secrecy in the secure PM-MSR code.
Theorem 3 (Reconstruction and Repair): In code C(s) pre-
sented above, a data-collector can recover all the B(s) message
symbols by downloading data stored in any k nodes, and a
failed node can be repaired by downloading one symbol each
from any d remaining nodes.
Proof: As in the proof of Theorem 1, treating the ran-
dom symbols also as message symbols, the secure PM-MSR
code C(s) becomes identical to the PM-MSR code C. Thus
reconstruction and repair in C(s) are identical to that in C.
Theorem 4 (Information-theoretic Secrecy): In code C(s)
designed for a given value of ℓ, an eavesdropper having access
to at most ℓ nodes gets no information pertaining to the
message.
Proof (Sketch): Let Ψ(s)eve be the (ℓ × d) submatrix
of Ψ(s), corresponding to the ℓ rows of Ψ to which the
eavesdropper has gained access. Further, let Φ(s)eve1 be the
(ℓ′ × α) submatrix of Φ(s), corresponding to the ℓ′ nodes in
which the eavesdropper has access to the repair downloads as
6well. Note that by definition of an {ℓ, ℓ′} secure system, these
ℓ′ nodes are a subset of the set of ℓ nodes that constitute the
matrix Ψ(s)eve . From the repair algorithm of the PM-MSR code
of [2], it turns out that the symbols E that the eavesdropper
gains access to comprises the elements of the (ℓ × α) matrix
Ψ
(s)
eveM and the elements of the (d× ℓ′) matrix M(Φ(s)eve1)t.
Following the approach described in Section II, and in a
manner analogous to the proof of Theorem 2, it can first be
shown that given the message symbols as side information, an
eavesdropper can decode all the random symbols. Next, using
the properties of the matrix Ψ(s) and the specific structure of
the message matrix M (s), it can also be shown that H(E) ≤
R. Finally, the arguments in (14) to (20) established that the
eavesdropper obtains no information about the message.
The extension to the case d > 2k − 2 can be achieved
via shortening ([2], [5]), using which one can use any linear
secure MSR code with parameters [n+ 1, k + 1, d+ 1, ℓ+
1, ℓ′] to construct a linear secure MSR code for parameters
[n, k, d, ℓ, ℓ′].
V. DISCUSSION
The Product-Matrix framework [2] possesses two particular
attributes that make the codes built in this framework attractive
from the security perspective. First, many codes in the litera-
ture including those in [1] consider functional repair, wherein
the data stored in the replacement node is permitted to be
different from that of the failed node as long as it satisfies the
reconstruction and functional-repair properties of the system.
This allows an eavesdropper to gain a greater amount of
information by reading the data stored in a node across
multiple instances of repair. On the other hand, PM codes offer
exact-repair, wherein the data stored in the replacement node
is identical to that in the failed node. Second, even if repair is
exact, the data downloaded during repair of a particular node
may depend on the set of d nodes helping in the repair process,
and hence may be different during different instances of repair
of that node. The PM framework, by design, ensures that
the information contained in the symbols downloaded by the
replacement node is independent of the identities of the helper
nodes. This restricts information exposed to an eavesdropper
that has access to the data downloaded during repair.
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